The Finance Brown Bag Seminar is held by the Institute for Finance, Banking and Insurance (WU Vienna) and the Vienna Graduate School of Finance (VGSF). It serves as a presentation platform for PhD students, faculty members, and visitors. An overview of BBS on the website of the Institute for Finance, Banking and Insurance.
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Günter Strobl, University of Vienna
The Economics of Scientific Misconduct: When Imperfect Deterrence Enhances Welfare
with Andrew Winton (Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota)
We develop a principal-agent model in which an effort-averse agent must be incentivized to conduct a research project. The agent privately observes whether her project succeeds or fails and, in the case of failure, can commit fraud to make it appear successful. The principal observes the project outcome and a signal of potential misconduct, but cannot directly observe the agent’s ability, effort cost, or effort level. We show that a contract that tolerates fraud can be optimal, as it enhances the informativeness of observed outcomes about the agent’s effort level, thereby reducing the agent’s information rent. Moreover, we identify conditions where harsher punishment for fraud increases fraudulent behavior.
